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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JANE B. CARTER, also known as
MRS. J. W. CARTER,

Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
GEORGE S. SPENCER, GEORGE]. CANNON,
LAURENCE E. ELLISON, JAMES E. ELLISON,
MORRIS H. ELLISON, J. WM. KNIGHT,

No. 8249

Defendants and Appellants,
and
ELLISON RANCHING COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, and ELLISON RANCHING
COMPANY, a Nevada Corporation,

Defendants

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Come now the appellants above named and petition the
court for a hearing and reargument of the above cause upon
the following grounds, to-wit:
3
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
MINUTES OF THE STOCKHOLDER'S MEETING WHICH
AFFIRMATIVELY SHOW THAT THE RESPONDENT
VOTED FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE ELLISON
RANCHING COMPANY.

POINT II
THE COURT'S QUOTATION FROM THE RECORD
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE STATEMENTS OF THE
COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS UNWILLING TO
ACCEPT STOCK IN THE NEW CORPORATION.

POINT III
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSITION THAT BY REASON OF THE CONDUCT OF
RESPONDENT'S PROXY SHE IS STOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE REORGANIZATION.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DIRECTORS ARE LIABLE FOR THE ACTION TAKEN
BY THE STOCKHOLDERS.
POINT V
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE PURPOSE AND
INTENT OF THE STIPULATION STATED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
4
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS THE SPECULATIVE VALUE
OF THE CORPORATE ASSETS INSTEAD OF THE FAIR
MARKET VALUE OF THE STOCK.
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER PRAYS TI-IAT THE
JUDGMENT AND OPINION OF THE COURT BE RECALLED AND A REARGUMENT BE PERMITTED OF
THE ENTIRE CASE.
A BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION IS FILED
HEREWITH.
]. D. SKEEN
F. R. BAYLE
E.]. SKEEN
Attorneys for Appellants and Petitioners

E.]. SKEEN hereby certifies that he is one of the attorneys
of record for the appellant and petitioner herein, and that in
his opinion there is good cause to believe that the judgment
and decision of the Court is erroneous and that the case should
be reheard and reargued as prayed for in said Petition.
Dated this 9th day of August, 1955.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
The appellants sincerely urge that the Court has not fully
considered the facts in this case and has ignored fundamental
legal principles which are properly applicable. For example,
on page 2 of the mimeographed opinion, the Court made the
following statement and underlined it:

that she (Jane B. Carter) stated her unwillingness to
accept stock in the Nevada corporation for her stock
in the Utah corporation."
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court then states:
((This finding of fact is supported by the following
testimony of James W. Carter, plaintiff's proxy."
The testimony of James W. Carter, quoted in the opinion,
does not expressly or by implication, support the underlined
statement of the Court. It merely is to the effect that the proxy
declined to vote to subscribe to the articles of incorporation of
the new corporation because the stock in the new corporation
was assessable. The Court failed to point out in its opinion that
the stock in the old corporation was like-wise assessable and ignored the well settled law that declining to vote did not
legally establish the position of respondent as a dissenting
stockholder. The points briefly alluded to above and the other
points stated in the petition for rehearing will be discussed
under the following headings:
1. The Court disregarded the minutes of the stockholders'

meeting.
2. The record does not support the Court's conclusion that

the respondent was a dissenting stockholder.
3. The Court did not consider the question of estoppel.
4. The directors were not guilty of a breach of trust.
5. The stipulation was misconstrued.
6. The Court ignored the well settled law as to the measure
of damages.

POINT I
THE COURT DISREGARDED THE MINUTES OF
THE STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING.

6
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.
The special meeting of the stockholders to consider reorganizing the Ellison Ranching Company under Nevada Law
was held on May 29, 1952, at Layton, Utah. The official
minutes of the meeting appear on pages 289 to 292 inclusive of
the bound minute book, Exhibit P-8. Notes from which the
minutes were prepared were taken by plaintiff's proxy, her son,
James W. Carter. They were offered by defendant, marked P-2,
and received in evidence. They are quoted on pages 6 and 7
of appellants' brief. The notes, Exhibit P-2, and the part of
the official minute book, Exhibit P -8, devoted to the meeting
of May 29, 1952 are entirely consistent. They both show that
plaintiff's proxy voted for the resolution attached to the notice
of the meeting and the minutes. No dissenting vote fas recorded
in the entire meeting. The only resolution upon which the
plaintiff refrained from voting was the one relating to the
form of articles of incorporation. The notes taken by Carter
show the following:
((Mr. Carter present but not voting on this resolution."
This fact is recorded on page 292 of the official minute
book.
This Court has apparent! y given no weight to the official
minutes of the meeting or to the notes taken by Mr. Carter.
It is undisputed that Carter acted as proxy for the respondent,
and she was undoubtedly bound by his vote. If Carter was his
mother's proxy his vote was her legal act. The vote is the
significant legal act, not what Carter might have said after
the stockholders' meeting adjourned.
The failure of this Court to recognize the fundamental
rule that the vote of the stockholders present at a legally called
meeting as recorded on the official minutes of the corporation
establish the legal rights of the parties was serious error which
7
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justifies the granting of· a ·rehearing in this case. The statement
in the opinion that the evidence as to what occurred at the
meeting of May 29, 1952 (Cis hopelessly in conflict" is not
supported by the record. The important thing which occurred,
namely, the vote on the resolution for reorganization was
recorded in the official minutes and in Carter's notes, and that
vote for reorganization should have ended this lawsuit.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A DISSENTING STOCKHOLDER.
As stated above, the record does not support a finding that
the plaintiff voted against reorganization or even expressed,
through her proxy at the stockholders' meeting, an unwillingness to go along with the plan outlined · at the meeting. Her
proxy simply refrained from voting to accept the proposed
articles of incorporation of the new corporation. The authorities
hold that refraining from voting constitutes assent. See 2 Cook
on Corporation, 6th Ed. Section 671, p. 2016:
teA stockholder who takes part in and assents to the
action of a stockholder's meeting which authorizes a sale
of the property to another corporation in exchange for
stock of the latter to be issued to stockholders of the
former cannot afterwards object thereto and demand
cash, even though his assent was only by refraining from

voting against the proposition.n
See also, Carr v. Rochester etc. Co., 207 Pa. St. 392 and
Martin v. Chute, 34 Minn. 135, 24 N. W. 353
The record is clear that Carter did not vote against a single
proposition. The most he did was to refrain from voting on
8
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the acceptance of the new articles because the stock was assessable. The stock in the old corporation was also assessable so
he had no point there.

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION
OF ESTOPPEL.
It is evident from the op1n1on that the Court did not
consider the question of estoppel. This is a clear case for the
application of that principle. Here are the essential elements:
1. The plaintiff voted for reorganization and for all of

the propositions except the form of articles of incorporation.
She refrained from voting on that proposition and that is
deemed to be assent.
2. Carter said he would take the mater of the articles

up with his mother and v1ould notify the officers of the
company of her attitude on the new articles. He did not communicate with them again.
3. The officers, in reliance upon the favorable vote on
reorganization and upon the silence of Carter on the matter of
approval of the new articles, proceeded to dissolve the Utah
corporation and to organize a new corporation.
4. The plaintiff, although notified of the dissolution proceedings, failed to object.
5. After standing by for more than one year and four
months with knowledge that there was reliance upon the favorable vote for reorganization, the plaintiff changed her position,
claimed she was a dissenting stockholder an~ brought suit.
9
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She was clearly estopped from changing her position after
the company had acted in reliance upon ( 1) her vote for reorganization and ( 2) her silence in respect to the proceeding
for dissolution.
This Court ignored completely this obvious estoppel.

POINT IV
THE DIRECTORS WERE NOT GUlLTY OF A
BREACH OF TRUST.
The Court's brief discussion of the question of personal
liability of the directors indicates a lack of consideration of
certain elementary legal concepts.
1. The ultimate source of corporate authority to act upon
matters not delegated by the statute or the articles of incorporation, is the vote of the stockholders.
2. The board of directors acts within the authority vested
in it by the statute, the articles of incorporation and by the
stockholders.

3·. The source of power to reorganize in the manner described in the resolution attached to the notice of the meeting
of May 29, 1952, was action of the stockholders.
4. In the absence of fraud the directors of a corporation
acting under the authority of a resolution of the stockholders
are not liable to a non-consenting stockholder.
See 15 Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, Perm. Ed.
page 248, Section 7166
13 Am. Jur., Section 1225, page 1118
89 Am. St. R. 622
10
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International G. N. Ry. Co. vs. Bremand, 53 Tex. 96
Holmes v. Crane, 182 N. Y. S. 270
3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp., Sec. 1021, p. 527
The Court has erred in holding that the directors are
personally liable where admittedly (a) they had no part in
the process of reorganizing other than to recommend that it
be done (b) the source of authority to act was the stockholders
and (c) there is no allegation or proof of any personal fraud
or misconduct on the part of the directors. The Court has
apparently not considered the authorities cited above which
were not answered or distinguished by opposing counsel or
by the Court.
POINTV
THE STIPULATION WAS MISCONSTRUED
Although the trial court's statement of the stipulation
regarding the appraisal of the assets of the corporation is set
forth in the opinion, this Court has failed to pro peri y construe
it. It will be observed that it provides, ((that when that ascertainment is made, the court will apply the percentage of stock held
by this plaintiff to the total outstanding at that time, and avvard
to her that percentage of all assets as found by the three
.
appratsers
... ''
This, in plain language, is that the award will be against
the corporation for a percentage of the assets. There is no
nzention in the stipulation of a personal judgment against the
directors.
It was never the intention of the defendants to waive their
defense in the case. In fact the case had been submitted on the
question as to whether there could be any recovery at all. See
11
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TraRs. pp.- 111 and 173. Evidence was not offered on the
question of damages and the stipulation was the substitute for
that. On page -177 of the- transcript appears the following:
t(Mr. Skeen: There is no ruling made.
The Courf: No ruling made.
Mr. Skeen: -pending that.
The Court: That's right . . ."
The argument was made that because of the large amount
of the appraisal (more than double the highest price ever paid
for the stock of the Ellison Ranching Company) the appellants
were not satisfied and that they are nhedging" on their stipulation. The appellants have never repudiated the stipulation
but have contended that ( 1) the appraisal was not properly
made but consisted simply of an arbitrary guess (See pages
22 and 23 of appellants' brief) and (2) the Court did not
follow the stipulation as it simply provides for an naward to
her (of) that percentage of all assets as found by the three
appraisers." If the stipulation is to be followed fair play demands that it be followed as stated in the record. It is not fair
to read into the stipulation something that is not there-namely
an agreement for a personal money judgment against the
directors.
That the appraisal was arbitrary becomes evident upon a
perusal of pages 217 to 228 of the Record (Trans. 107-118).
Mr. Morris H. Ellison testified as to the practical difficulties
and large expense involved in gathering the livestock for sale.
Mr. Ellison testified that the estimated expense of gathering
the cattle would run from $100,000 to $150,000 and in addition
there would be the cost of transporting and marketing them.
There would, in case of liquidation, be a commission on the
sale of land and livestock. The appraisers estimated the cost

12
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of gathering at $8,500 and included no item at all for transportation and selling costs. The unfairness of the appraisal is
very obvious after reading Mr. Ellison's testimony. No basis
for arriving at the number of animal units or the value per
unit appears in the record. After hearing testimony the Court
made some adjustments but they were entirely inadequate in
view of Mr. Ellison's testimony.
POINT VI
THE COURT IGNORED THE WELL SETTLED LAW
AS TO DAMAGES.
The rule as to the measure of damages in cases like the
one before the Court is well stated in 13 American Jurisprudence, Section 1232, pages 1120-1121.
((The view has been taken that the market value of the
stock governs in determining the appraisement of preferred shares on consolidation or merger and not a
speculative value obtained by estimating the value of
the several properties and rights of the corporation and
dividing the same by the number of shares so as to
obtain the value of each share."
(Emphasis added)
See also, Annotation 8 7 A. L. R. 602
The Court did not either follow the stipulation as pointed
out above or follow the law. This Court has affirmed the
decree without consideration of all of the facts and without
application of the law discussed above.
It is respectfully submitted that the petition for rehearing
should be granted.
J.D. SKEEN
F. R. BAYLE
E. J. SKEEN
Attorneys for Appelants
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